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TWO DECADES OF THE FEDERAL CIVIL RULES
CHARLES E. CLARK*
Two decades of lively experience under the federal civil rules provide
adequate perspective for both survey and prognosis. The rules have been
thoroughly tried and not found wanting;' and the trend of state adoption is
proceeding apace. Now a quarter of the states are followers; half have
adopted substantial portions of the federal system;'and hardly a local
jurisdiction remains unaffected. North Dakota, Wyoming, and Idaho are
the most recent converts, with Alabama nearing decision and New York
more doubtful, and with promising developments in Maine, Montana,
New Hampshire, and Vermont, California, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and
West Virginia, among others.2 Finally, events of the moment virtually
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At the request of the author, citations in this article conform to his own style and not
necessarily to A Uniform System of Citations (9th ed. 1955).
1. This is Judge Chesnut's statement: "I have yet to note an instance in which they.
have been found lacking." Chesnut, Improvements in Judicial Procedure, 17 CONN. B.J.
238, 243 (1943). Among many similar encomia the following may be noted: VANDERBILT,,
IMPROVING THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTIcE-TWO DECADES OF DEVELOPMENT 90-91,
(1957); VANDERBILT, THE CHALLENGE OF LAW REFORM 57-58 (1955); Burton, "Judging Is
also Administration": An Appreciation of Constructive Leadership, 33 A.B.A.J. 1099, 1166,
1167 (1947); Herrmann, The New Rules of Procedure in Delaware, 18 F.R.D. 327, 346;
Holtzoff, A Judge Looks at the Rules After Ftfteen Years of Use, 15 F.R.D. 155, 174; Holtzoff,
Origin and Sources of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1057, 1058
(1955); Rives, A Court of Appeals Judge on the Federal Rules, 17 ALA. LAw. 324 (1956).
2. The following jurisdictions have adopted the federal civil rules fully: Alaska,
Arizona, Colorado, Delaware (separately for the unmerged courts of law and courts of
chancery), Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Puerto Rico, Utah, and Wyoming. Substantial portions, such as the dis-
covery provisions, the joinder provisions, and so on, have been adopted in Alabama, Cali-
fornia, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, New York,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington. Individual rules, notably Rule 16,
have been adopted in other states. The Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure (1957), proposed
by the Commission for Judicial Reform, closely follow the federal rules, but have not yet
been adopted by the state legislature. In Nebraska the rules as adopted were rejected and
the rule-making act repealed by the legislature in 1943, as stated in note 59 infra. Among
interesting accounts of local adopticns of the federal rules the following may be cited:
Allen, The New Rules in Arizona, 16 F.R.D. 183; Keely, How Colorado Conformed State
to Federal Civil Procedure, 16 F.R.D. 291; Herrmann, supra note 1; Sims, Recent Civil
Procedural Reform in Kentucky, 16 F.R.D. 397; Robertson, New Mexico Rules of Civil
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compel re-examination of the basic premises of rule-making and rule-
amendment. The discharge by the Supreme Court of its Advisory Commit-
tee3 and current plans for re-establishment of rule-making authority in
some more permanent form are bringing the issues to a head. 4 So I welcome
this symposium on the federal rules in a twenty-year perspective and con-
gratulate the editors of the Columbia Law Review on their initiative in
planning it.
It has been my fortunate privilege to have been closely associated with
the federal movement from an early date. That has involved initial support
for the ABA campaign for statutory authority,' followed by some activity,
upon enactment of the Act of June 19, 1934,1 for full reform centered upon
the basic union of law and equity.7 Then, when the Court assumed full
responsibility and appointed its Advisory Committee in 1935, I became
Reporter or draftsman responsible for the initial drafts both of the original
rules and of the later proposed amendments throughout the life of the Com-
mittee.8 No more stimulating or rewarding work has ever fallen to my lot.
Sometime I hope a history may be written of what was done and how; of
the gay Committee meetings and the dull; of the successes, which were
many, and the failures, which were few. And I trust that this will point up
the accomplishments of many now overlooked, of, among others, the trial
judges, the bar association committees, and the law professors-all of whom
Procedure for the District Courts, 16 F.R.D. 489; Hawkins, Mechanics of Adopting the Federal
Rules for State Practice, 38 J. Am. JuD. Soc'Y 57 (1954). See also Skinner, Alabama's Ap-
proach to a Modern System of Pleading and Practice, 20 F.R.D. 119. Several good local
practice books are now available, e.g., CLAY, KENTUc KY Civi, RuIs-PRAcaTC AND
PROCEDURE (1954); WRIGHT, MINmsOTA RULrEs (1954). Late developments are noted in
current numbers of the Journal of the American Judicature Society and the Federal Rules
Servce.
3. Order of October 1,1956, 352 U.S. 803. The Advisory Committee had been originally
named in an order of June 3, 1935, 295 U.S. 774, and made a continuing body by an order
of January 5, 1942, 314 U.S. 720.
4. See proposal sponsored by the Judicial Conference of the United States, Rep,
Jud. Conf., Sept. 18-20, 1957, pp. 7-8, discussed below in text at notes 43-46.
5. The article, Clark, Procedural Reform and the Supreme Court, 8 TE AmERICAN
MERCtRY 445 (1926), was the occasion of some interesting correspondence with the editor,
H. L. Mencken.
6. C. 651, 48 STAT. 1064, formerly 28 U.S.C. §§ 723b and c (1934), now appearing in
amended form in 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1952).
7. As authorized by the second section of the 1934 Act, 28 U.S.C. § 723c (1934),
48 STAT. 1064, as added to the bill in 1922 under the vigorous prompting of Chief Justice
Taft. See the account at note 24 infra and text.
8. Following the initial adoption of the rules on December 20, 1937 (effective on
September 16, 1938), see 308 U.S. 645, there were amendments of a minor nature, but
establishing the amending procedure, on December 28, 1939, 308 U.S. 642, effective April
3, 1941. More extensive amendments, but of a clarifying nature, were adopted on December
27, 1946, 329 U.S. 843, effective March 19, 1948. Certain amendments to conform to the
newly adopted Title 28 of the U.S. Code were adopted on December 29, 1948, 335 U.S.
923, effective October 20, 1949. And Rule 71A for the condemnation of property was
adopted on April 30, 1951, 341 U.S. 959, 962, effective August 1, 1951. The amendmentsproposed by the Committee in 1955, AnVsORY COR MTEE ON RLEs OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
REPORT OF PROPOSED .AmENDIMNTS To TE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR T1E UNITED
STATES DIT RICT S, Oct. 1955, have not been acted upon by the Court.
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contributed careful study and suggestion. Certainly to be included in such a
history would be the devoted and loyal efforts over the years of Committee
members, living and dead; and particularly to be explored is the part
played by that unique leader, William D. Mitchell, whose absolutely
invaluable contribution has been too little understood.9 And in this story the
part played by the Supreme Court itself must be given its proper notice.
For my part I have been too close to all this to view it objectively; and
I have written overmuch about it already--so much so that, in responding
to the editors' courteous invitation, I fear lest I merely repeat myself. 10 But
certain aspects of that history have immediate bearing on the future of
rule-making, and my connection with the movement gives me a basis for
some testimony I believe of value to present discussions. That concerns
particularly the role of the Court itself in past happenings"--a role I find
considerably misunderstood and minimized perhaps even by members of
the present Court. So to that phase of federal rule-making I shall address
myself particularly.
I. THE LEADERSHIP OF THE SUPREME COURT
For my present purpose I need not recount the pre-1934 history further
than to emphasize that, save for an early suggestion of David Dudley
Field for reform naturally by a "code,"' 2 the revision urged was always
for rule-making by the Supreme Court. The invariable dichotomy was
9. I take the liberty of quoting from my message to the Chief Justice on August 25,
1955, notifying him of Mr. Mitchell's death on the previous day: "Mr. Mitchell had a
distinguished career of public service. But I think there is no finer monument to his memory
than the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It has been my privilege to have worked long
and intimately with him in this activity; and I know what the strength and force of his
personality, his devotion to principle and his drive, have meant for the success of the Rules
and the standing they have obtained throughout the profession and the country. I am
thoroughly convinced that without his directing genius the Rules, if they had come to exist
at all, would have been a much lesser thing than they now are." See also Clark, Alabama's
Procedural Reform and the National Movement, 9 ALA. L. REv. 167, 168 (1957); Clark,
Objectives of Pre-Trial Procedure, 17 OHIO ST. L.J. 163 (1956); Clark, Foreword, 10 RUTGERS
L. Ray. 479, 481 (1956); Clark, The Influence of Federal Procedural Reform, 13 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 144, 148 n.16 (1948).
10. Much of the background appears in the writer's text, CLARK, CODE PLEADING
25-45 (2d ed. 1947), and in the law review articles cited in the footnotes to this article,
particularly in notes 11, 12, 19-26 infra.
11. See Holtzoff, Judicial Procedure Reform: The Leadership of the Supreme Court,
43 A.B.A.J. 215 (1957), and the editorial, Brilliant Leadership, 43 A.B.A.J. 240 (1957).
But see Moore, Address, A.B.A. Section of Judicial Administration, 21 F.R.D. 127, 128,
44 A.B.A.J. 44, 45, 92 (1958); cf. Statement of Chief Justice Warren, 21 F.R.D. 118, 44
A.B.A.J. 42, 43 (1958); Address by Justice Reed, 21 F.R.D. 139, 140, 44 A.B.A.J. 92-94
(1958). That this history has not been detailed in the literature (see note 10 supra) is
doubtless because, as noted in the text below, the Court's pre-eminent role has hitherto
been taken for granted.
12. 9 A.B.A. REp. 551 (1886); 9 A.B.A. REP. 503 (1886); see 11 A.B.A. REP. 63,
79 (1888); 10 A.B.A. REP. 317 (1887). For the history see CLARK, CODE PLEADING 25-45
(2d ed. 1947); Editorial, Supreme Court Adopts Rules for Civil Procedure in Federal District
Courts, 24 A.B.A.J. 97 (1938); Sunderland, The Grant of Rule-Making Power to the Supreme
Court of the United States, 32 MICH. L. REv. 1116 (1934).
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between Court and Congress; no intermediate judicial or semijudicial body
was contemplated.1" In the light of later discussions this is a truly out-
standing fact. Thus from the beginning it appears to have been felt quite
universally that the Court's prestige was necessary to support this important
branch of law-making. The Court had always had and exercised quite
extensive rule-making powers. Some of these, particularly those dealing
with control of appellate procedure, were resorted to later by the Advisory
Committee, with at least silent approval by the Court," to supply certain
gaps in authority left by the 1934 Act. The Equity Rules were an established
part of the Court's authority; and the success of the Uniform Equity Rules
of 1912 sparked the movement for a like success at law."5 In response to the
express advocacy of Chief Justice Taft, the plans were expanded in 1922 to
include the union of law and equity, always under the aegis of the Court."5
So it was the Court's leadership which was the loadstone for all efforts for
a modern federal procedure. And in due course after the passage of the Act
the Court responded-quite magnificently, as events have shown.
Those who now tend to understate the Court's participation either have
not known or have forgotten the dramatic steps whereby the Court accepted
the responsibility which Congress had tendered it. For nearly a year the
Court took no action and seemed oblivious to the charge committed to it,
Meanwhile Attorney General Cummings, who had ultimately rescued the
bill and piloted it through with masterly skill when it seemed headed for
defeat, not unnaturally concluded that if the movement was to advance he
must provide the push. So he set up a drafting organization in the Depart-
13. See 19 A.B.A. REP. 411, 424 (1896) (committee report urging federal uniformity
and rule-making). See also the views of Chief Justice Taft, cited note 24 infra, and the annual
reports of the ABA's Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, beginning with 37 A.B.A.
REP. 35, 434-35 (1912). The literature on court rule-making is extraordinarily voluminous;
adequate leads for present purposes may be found in the ABA Handbook, THE IMPROVE-
MENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 10-21 (3d ed. 1952); CLARK, CODE PLEADING
59-62 (2d ed. 1947); INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, RULE-MAKING POWER
OF THE COURTS 1-67 (1955); VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRA-
T ON 91-145 (1949); Clark & Wright, The Judicial Council and the Rule-Making Power:
A Dissent and a Protest, 1 SYRACUSE L. REV. 346 (1950); Joiner & Miller, Rules of Practice
4-nd Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule Making, 55 MICH. L. REV. 623 (1957). The classic
-description of the English system is ROSENBAUM, THE RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY IN THE
ENGLISH SUPREME COURT (1917).
14. This background is explained in detail in Lopinsky v. Hertz Drive-Ur-Self Systems,
194 F.2d 422, 424-26 (2d Cir. 1951). See also Clark, Power of the Supreme Court to Make
Rules of Appellate Procedure, 49 HARV. L. REv. 1303 (1936); Foreword to ADVISORY COM-
MITTEE ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF RULES OF CIVIL PROCE.-
3URE, May 1936, at xi, xii, reprinted in the Lopinsky case.
15. See, e.g., Lane, Twenty Years Under the Federal Equity Rules, 46 HARV. L. REV. 638
(1933), and earlier articles there cited. The Equity Rules of 1912 appear in 226 U.S. App.
I, 33 Sup. Ct. V, 57 L. Ed. 1633, and are reprinted after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in 28 U.S.C.A. The indebtedness of the present rules to these rules is shown throughout
in the Committee's Notes to Rules of Civil Procedure and in Table I of the Appendix
thereto.
16. See note 7 supra and text, and notes 20, 21, 23-27 infra.
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ment of Justice, to be aided by a committee with duties more honorific
than specific. 17 His plan was to provide only uniform rules at law to supple-
ment the existing and popular Equity Rules. 18 This seemed a comparatively
simple task and one designed to avoid conservative opposition. But to
many of us this seemed a truncated reform, indeed. There is little doubt but
that this movement was checked by William D. Mitchell, whose powerful
letter of February 9, 1935, to Chief Justice Hughes, setting forth the need for
the full reform, was clearly the deciding factor in the Supreme Court's
decision, if not in its choice of him as Chairman of the Advisory Committee. 19
The present writer can claim to have contributed to this happy result. For,
as Mr. Mitchell acknowledged when fourteen years later he was persuaded
to give the letter publicity, it was the writer's campaign for united rules
which aroused him to action."0 At any rate, Chief Justice Hughes' announce-
ment of the Court's assumption of full responsibility, made in his annual
address to the American Law Institute on May 9, 1935, is a notable milestone
in this history.21 This was followed by the appointment of the Advisory
Committee on June 3, 1935, and led to a complete reversal of the developing
trend to a continuance of the divided procedure.
A re-examination of the Chief Justice's address is not without profit
for our present problems. Two things seem of peculiar interest. One is of
course the decision of the Court to accept its responsibility to the utmost.
This was signalized by its determination to appoint its own committee to
assist it in the task. This meant, as we soon found out, that all plans already
initiated for work in the Department of Justice had to cease and the Com-
mittee's office had to be in the Court's own building, where it remained for
17. Colonel Edgar B. Tolman, Editor of the American Bar Association Journal, who
had been appointed a Special Assistant to the Attorney General to take charge of the work
of drafting, was chairman, and the writer was one of the Committee members. For the
Committee personnel, see 18 J. Am. JuD. Soc'Y 163 (1935); and for the general plans, which
included many local committees to be set up by the senior circuit judges, see 20 A.B.A.J.
713-16 (1934), and 20 Mass. L.Q., Feb. 1935, pp. 41, 44. As the Attorney General
reported the next year, "more than one hundred federal judges, five hundred practicing
lawyers and many law teachers and research scholars are participating in this great project."
21 A.B.A.J. 403,404 (1935).
18. This was apparently the view of the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, 20
A.B.A.J. 713, 715, 716 (1934), as well as of others, as pointed out in the articles cited in
notes 19, 20 infra. See also Supreme Court Needs Rule-Making Commission, 18 J. AM.
JUD. Soc'Y 131, 132 (1935), and Policies Involved in Federal Rule Making, 18 J. Am. JUD.
Soc'Y 134-37 (1935), setting forth the proposal of Newton D. Baker for a uniform federal
system in the common law states and local conformity in the code states.
19. Mitchell, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD CENTENARY
EssAYs 73, 76-78 (1949).
20. Mitchell, supra note 19; see Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure-I.
The Background, 44 YALE L.J. 387 (1935); Clark, The Challenge of a New Federal Civil
Procedure, 20 CORNELL L.Q. 443 (1935); Clark, The Challenge for a New Federal Civil Proce-
dure, 19 J. Amt. Jun. Soc'v 8 (1935).
21. Address of Chief Justice Hughes, 21 A.B.A.J. 340, 55 Sup. Ct. xxxv, 12 A.L.I.
PROCEEDINGS 54 (1935); see Dramatic Pronouncement by Chief Justice Hughes, 19 J. Am.
JuD. Soc'Y 3, 5 (1935); Chief Justice Hughes on Rule-Making, id. at 6-8.
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twenty-one years. Even the symbolism of the Court's activity had to
be exact.2 2
The second is the Chief Justice's succinct and convincing statement
of the grounds which had led the Court to act at once on the mandate for
the union of law and equity, rather than to content itself with only the partial
reform.2 3 In the course of this exposition he quoted from Chief Justice
Taft's original advocacy of that course in 1922, which followed Taft's
fine opinion in Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat. Bank, as reported in 260
U.S. 235, in accordance, too, with the best principles of code pleading in
such states as Taft's own Ohio.2 4 Since this principle has now become well
nigh universal, after its adoption in the federal rules, it is difficult to recapture
the former doubts; but that they were real is shown by a settled view of
the era that union of law and equity in the federal courts would be un-
constitutional-so strong a view that the powerful voices of Roscoe Pound,
William H. Taft, and others25 had not been sufficient to allay doubts.
Some question arose because of the ambiguous nature of the original Act
of 1934, and a few voices from the past were still to be heard." But actually
22. Colonel Tolman gave up his position in the Department of Justice and established
the office of Secretary of the Committee in the Supreme Court Building, with appropriate
letterheads, etc.
23. The Chief Justice in discussing the goal of a simplified practice said that "we
should not be fettered by being compelled to maintain the historic separation of the proce-
dural systems of law and equity"; that those who had practiced under a unified system
would not "entertain for a moment the suggestion that they should go back to the old
separate methods"; that while in certain jurisdictions, including that with which he was
especially familiar (i.e., New York), the simple form originally adopted "came to be overlaid
with procedural monstrosities due to legislative tinkering and elaboration," yet "[sluch
experiences have taught a lesson and in the improvement we contemplate in the federal
system we shall have the advantage of the simplicity and flexibility made possible by the
exercise on the part of the Court of its rule-making power." Then, after quoting from Chief
Justice Taft's article, Possible and Needed Reforms in Administration of Justice in Federal
Courts, 8 A.B.A.J. 601, 47 A.B.A. REP. 250 (1922), cited note 24 infra, that this was a"perfectly possible and important improvement in the practice in the federal courts [which]
ought to have been made long ago" (thus rebutting the picture of Taft as a hopeless con-
servative), Mr. Hughes went on to demolish each argument for delay or partial reform,
such as the attitude of the Bar and Bench toward the two-step form of the Enabling Act,
note 7 supra, the supposed difficulties, and so on. Indeed, what he said could be taken as
the complete answer to yet more modern suggestions for merely partial or halfhearted reform.
24. Taft, Possible and Needed Reforms in Administration of Justice in Federal Courts,
8 A.B.A.J. 601, 604, 607, 47 A.B.A. REP. 250, 259-61, 268 (1922). See also Taft, Three
Needed Steps of Progress, 8 A.B.A.J. 34, 35 (1922). He had made the suggestion both of the
unified procedure and of rule-maklng by the Supreme Court at least as early as 1914.
Taft, The Attacks on the Courts and Legal Procedure, Ky. L.J., vol. 5, No. 1, Nov. 1916, pp.
3, 14-15 (Address at Cincinnati Law School Commencement, May 23, 1914); Taft, Address
as President of the A.B.A., 39 A.B.A. REP. 359, 381 (1914); see his testimony in Hearings
Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 2432, 2433, and 2523, 67th Cong., 1st
Sess. 16-17 (1921). See also Burton, Judging Is also Administration: An Appreciation of
Constructive Leadership, 33 A.B.A.J. 1099, 1101, 1166 (1947). Taft was a state court judge
in Ohio, 1887-1890, before his federal executive and judicial service.
25. Pound, Law and Eguity in the Federal Courts, 36 A.B.A. REP. 470, 73 CENT. L.J.
204 (1911); Taft, Possible and Needed Reforms in Administration of Justice in Federal
Courts, 8 A.B.A.J. 601, 47 A.B.A. REP. 250 (1922); HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAI DEVELOP-
MENT OF CODE PLEADING 162-64 (1897); McCormick, The Fusion of Law and Equity in the
United States Courts, 6 N.C.L. REv. 283 (1928).
26. See discussion in Sunderland, Character and Egqtent of the Rule-Making Power
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this in retrospect appears as one of the most easily accomplished, as well as
quite outstanding, improvements effected by the rules.27 What an emas-
culated reform we would have had if the Court had not stepped in so oppor-
tunely and so decisively! The effect on state practice has likewise been
beneficial; thus a dying gasp in New Jersey for an asserted inevitable separa-
tion was overcome by forceful local leadership following the federal model.2 s
Since that initial forthright step the Supreme Court has made its
procedural conclusions clear whenever it has been called upon to do so.
The apparently prevalent idea that the Court should have more actively and
continuously directed the Committee's activities was clearly not the concept
o(Justice Hughes and his colleagues. Instead they contemplated just what
has happened, 29 namely, a supervision which would become active when
necessary, but should leave details to what an often disagreeing Justice has
termed "the informed judgment" of the Committee." The Court's action in
adopting the original rules in 1937 went far toward settling the manner of
proceeding and the validity of various provisions, including not only the
union of law and equity, but also rules of evidence and of appellate procedure
so far as affected by trial court action, of service of process, of extensive
examination, and the like. This has been followed by a now considerable
line of notable decisions upholding the rules,"' culminating in the relatively
Granted U.S. Supreme Court and Methods of Effective Exercise, 21 A.B.A.J. 404 (1935); cf.
McCaskill, One Form of Action, but What Procedure, for the Federal Courts? 30 ILL. L. REV.
415 (1935).
27. Here, too, the literature is extensive. See, e.g., James, Trial by Jury and the New
Federal Rules of Procedure, 45 YALE L.J. 1022 (1936) (giving the background of research for
Rule 38, the basic provision as to jury trial); Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 38;
Holtzoff, Equitable and Legal Rights and Remedies under the New Federal Procedure, 31
CALIF. L. REv. 127 (1943); Joiner & Geddes, The Union of Law and Equity; A Prerequisite
to Procedural Revision, 55 MicH. L. REv. 1059 (1957); Morris, Jury Trial under the Federal
Fusion of Law and Equity, 20 TExAs L. REv. 427 (1942); Editorial, One Form of Action,
32 A.B.A.J. 408 (1946); Pike & Fischer, Pleadings and Jury Rights in the New Federal
Procedure, 88 U. PA. L. REv. 645 (1940). For the contrasting New York difficulties, see
Clark, A Modern Procedure for New York, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1194, 1203-06 (1955). For
illustrative federal cases see Alcoa S.S. Co. v. Ryan, 211 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1954); Groome v.
Steward, 142 F.2d 756 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Hurwitz v. Hurwitz, 136 F.2d 796, 799 (D.C.
Cir. 1943).
28. For discussion of the New Jersey reform of 1947 and 1948 overriding persistent
nostalgia for the past, see Clapp, Making the Federal Rules a Part of New Jersey's Practice,
16 F.R.D. 39; Clark, Code Pleading and Practice Today, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD CENTENARY
EssAYs 55, 70-72 (1949); Clark, Divided Law and Equity Jurisdiction, 28 J. Am. JUD. Soc'Y
29 (1944); 67 N.J.L.J. 152 (1944); and the references in CLARK, CODE PLEADING 28 n.69
(2d ed. 1947).
29. See Chief Justice Hughes' outline of the process and its analogy to that of the
American Law Institute in drafting the restatements in his annual address to the Institute
in 1936: "The Advisory Committee on Rules has drawn its spirit and organization from
your example." 22 A.B.A.J. 374, 375 (1936). See also note 21 supra.
30. Justice Frankfurter concurred in the order, 329 U.S. 843 (1946), see note 8 supra,
"in approval of the proposed amendments essentially because of his confidence in the in-
formed judgment of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure."
31. See, e.g., Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941), upholding the validity of
Rule 35(a), authorizing orders for physical or mental examination of persons; Mississippi
Publishihg Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946), holding valid Rule 4 (f), authorizing
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recent ones sustaining the validity of the amended Rule 54(b) concerning
final judgments.32 These decisions form a veritable bulwark of reform in
themselves. And the Court was called upon to, and soon did, clear up
various ambiguities in the process left by the original act, including even the
power and manner of amending the rules.3"
This same approach is exemplified by the nature of the proposed rules
which the Court rejected. These have been few in number, but each has
represented a problem which the Court could with propriety seek to avoid.
On the first draft there were two: one involving problems of jurisdiction,
the other concerning evidence.3 4 In the 1948 revision there were three rules
rejected, but each presented a problem then before the Court for adjudication
in a particular case. 5 Finally the most extensive action of all was taken
with respect to the trial provision of the more recent condemnation rule,
Rule 71A. Here the Committee, after much deliberation and by a divided
vote, had ultimately decided on a rule against the practice of various of the
states allowing a jury trial in all cases of timely demand; but the Supreme
Court, impressed by the need for uniformity in the condemnation of great
territories as required in some of the mammoth federal developments, had
directed reconsideration by the Committee. The final form of the rule,
still slanted toward jury trial but allowing the court some discretion in
enforcing the uniformity indicated, is thus due to the direct control of the
Court."v
service of summons without the district but within the state; Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495 (1947), sustaining the validity of certain discovery provisions; ef. Rule 30(b).
32. Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Engineering & Foundry Co., 351 U.S. 445 (1956);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427 (1956). These cases, and those cited note
31 supra, expressly discuss the issue of validity; of course in numerous cases a variety of
specific rules have been accepted without debate. After these latest cases it does not seem
likely that other rules will be subject to a like attack.
33. By the amendment adopted Dec. 28, 1939, 308 U.S. 642.
34. Proposed Rule 77 of the Reports of April 1937 and November 1937 on Registration
of Judgments in Other District Courts, as to which a Committee Note raised the question
of power, and proposed Rules 26(c) and 44(b) in part dealing with the extent of cross-
examination to contradict of a party and of a witness not a party called by the adversary.
The first matter is now covered by 28 U.S.C. § 1963, enacted in 1948.
35. Proposed amendments to Rule 25(a), dealing with substitution of a party on his
death; Rule 30(b), dealing with protective orders in deposition cases; and Rule 50, dealing
with a moticn for a directed verdict. See Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482 (1947);
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330
U.S. 212 (1947), comprising the cases then pending before the Court.
36. This generally overlooked bit of history, including the Court's direction of Decem-
ber 23, 1948, returning the draft to the Committee, is fully set forth in the Supplementary
Report of March 1951, at 1-18, proposing the draft which was adopted by the Court on
April 30, 1951, 341 U.S. 959, 963. See note 8 supra; Clark, The Proposed Condemnation
Rule, 10 OHIo ST. L.J. 1 (1949).
37. Incidentally, this is the rule which has achieved the steady, though not too well
informed, opposition of the American Bar Association. The latest action of the ABA
reiterating its opposition to the trial provision, Rule 71A(h), is found in 43 A.B.A.J. 1047,
1048 (1957). The latest action of the Judicial Conference of the United States reiterating
its support is found in Rep. Jud. Conf., Sept. 18-20, 1957, p. 33. This followed the report of
a Committee, with Judge John J. Parker as Chairman, made after extended study and
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The measure of success which court rule-making has thus achieved is
attested by the general satisfaction of judges, practitioners, and scholars
with the federal system and its increasing adoption in the states.3" But
perhaps the truest indicia of all are in the attitude of Congress. Prior to
the rules, the difficulties of the Conformity Act and the constant amend-
ments of procedure by the legislature were all too well known; they were
perhaps the most prominent argument for reform. 9 Since the advent of the
rules the result has been quite phenomenal. Notwithstanding many pro-
posals, Congress has withstood all attempts to obtain passage of procedural
statutes of any consequence. A search has turned up in the rules area only a
single statute, one of no far-reaching import.4" Congress has seemed literally
uninterested in all such proposals, and committee chairmen have quite
regularly turned them over to the Court or the Advisory Committee for
final attention. The fear of recurrence of legislative tinkering has been a
profound stimulus for the presently contemplated reconstitution of the
Advisory Committee. 41
II. A CONTINUING ROLE FOR AN ADVISORY COMMITTEE
While the rule-making process has been therefore quite generally effec-
tive, it has disclosed certain gaps where response to felt needs may not
be immediately forthcoming. These concern particularly matters debated
among and dividing the bar, such as the more extensive reaches of the dis-
covery process. The Court is not equipped and should not be expected to
conduct extensive research on its own; this is a task to be performed for it
by others, leaving only broad decisions of policy to be ultimately settled
by the Court. And for this task an Advisory Committee only occasionally
stimulated into activity on an ad hoc basis is not wholly adequate. It
cannot keep as consistent or wise an over-all watch on procedural develop-
ments as is needed; and it is not in a position to fend off attacks from inter-
ested groups or defend its work when completed. 42 What is needed is an
adopted at the meeting of the Conference in March 1952, Rep. Jud. Conf., March 20-21,
1952, pp. 203-05.
38. See notes 1, 2 supra and accompanying text.
39. See materials cited notes 13, 19, 20 supra.
40. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1952) (a provision for the pleading of defenses to a patent suit,
such as noninfringement and invalidity, appearing in the Patent Act of 1942).
41. This has been a recurring theme in the literature cited above; it has been deftly
stated by Chief Justice Hughes, see note 23 supra, and by Mr. Mitchell, see note 19 supra.
42. On two occasions Chairman Mitchell submitted briefs amicus to the Court in his
own name to guard against obvious mistakes pressed on the Court. Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495 (1947); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941); see note 31 supra. But
generally speaking even this limited form of support has not been feasible. Contrast the
position of an Act of Congress where the Attorney General is commissioned by law to defend
the validity of legislation before the federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (1952). Thus such a
one-sided brief as that filed with the Court on March 10, 1956, by the International Associa-
tion of Insurance Counsel, attacking proposed discovery amendments-cf. J. H. Groce,
22 INS. COUNSEl. J. 131 (1955) and 23 id. 7 (1956)-must needs remain unanswered.
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expansion of present features shown by experience to be wise in order to
have a firmer basis in the profession at large and in the administrative
processes of the federal judicial establishment itself. Such a plan is to be
found in the present proposal of the Judicial Conference of the United States,
already widely supported in the profession and among the judges, including
members of the Court itself. 43
There are three main features of this proposal: (1) retention of the
present authority of the Supreme Court and of the existing rule-making
statutes without amendment; (2) bringing of the Judicial Conference into
the rule-making process by an amendment to its statutory powers to include
recommendations to the Court as to rule innovations or changes as proposed
by an advisory committee of practitioners, judges, and scholars responsible
to the Conference; and (3) establishment in the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts of a new division devoted to the continuous study
of procedural operations of the courts under a dedicated chief who would
also serve as secretary or reporter for the newly constituted Advisory Com-
mittee.44 This seems a scheme skillfully designed to exploit the best features
of the present system and to fill the gaps now apparent in it. The Court as
the ultimate source of power is still the keystone of the arch. But by reliev-
ing itself of unique responsibility for initiating steps in the process, the
Court sheds a burden which has obviously troubled it of late. On the other
hand, the process of continuous supervision of the court system by its
administrative officers not only assures better co-ordination of the system
as a whole, but will supply means for extension of Mr. Mitchell's invaluable
original concept of active participation in the process by the bench and bar
of the country. 45 For the division in charge will be able to bring the activities
of the Advisory Committee, its studies, and deliberations to the active
attention of bar associations, law schools, circuit conferences, and all like
43. For the proposal see note 44 infra and see the statement of Chief Justice Warren
and the addresses of Justices Clark and Reed, Chief Judge Biggs, Professor Moore, and
Mr. Scanlon before the ABA Section of Judicial Administration, Nov. 7, 1957, 21 F.R.D.
117-41, 44 A.B.A.J. 42-45, 92-94 (1958).
44. Rep. Jud. Conf., Sept. 18-20, 1957, pp. 7, 8. As a careful reading of these minutes
shows, the proposal to amend the rule-making statutes themselves was rejected to leave
the Court's authority intact.
45. See statement of Chief Justice Warren, 21 F.R.D. 118, 119, 44 A.B.A.J. 42, 43
(1958). For the plan followed with respect to the original rules, see references in notes
17, 19, 27, 29 supra; Clark, A Striking Feature of the Proposed New Rules, 22 A.B.A.J. 787
(1936). This solid foundation of support accounts in large measure for the success accorded
the rules in their acceptance by the Court in all but exceptional instances, see notes 34, 35
supra, and also in their united approval in the Committee itself. Only twice has there been
dissent: once in 1946, on a single feature of the discovery process, by a member whose illness
had prevented his participation in Committee meetings and discussions; and again more
extensively, if belatedly, in 1955 by a recently appointed member, see note 51 infra. Against
this background of accomplishment, criticism of the Committee for failure to hold public
hearings (see Moore, supra note 11) seems gratuitous. Rule-making is a matter for research,
study, and judicious analysis and critiques, not one for the public platform. Actually the
Committee throughout its history responded to all reasonable requests for hearings.
[Vol. 58
1958] TWO DECADES OF THE FEDERAL CIVIL RULES 445"
bodies. For one thing, with such material at hand the annual circuit
conference required by statute in each circuit should be much more realis-
tically activated to consider the procedural problems of its courts than is
now the case.46
In a sense this is a return to earlier ideas advanced at the dawn of
federal rule-making. In its first report in May 1936 the Advisory Committee
recommended the establishment of a standing committee, meeting annually
or oftener and submitting annual reports to the Court;4 7 and this idea has
been quite widely supported elsewhere, as in a resolution adopted by the
American Bar Association in 1942.48 Some provision for regular reports
seems peculiarly necessary because of a condition developing largely from
the very popularity of the rules. The wide interest in their operation has
led to the most extensive writing and reporting of rules decisions and the
publication of texts and rules services. This popularity has been far from an
unmixed blessing; it has in fact led almost inevitably to glosses upon the
original rules, obscuring, if not distorting, their meaning. Judges and writers
have enjoyed writing about these new developments, particularly while
they seem fresh and original. The very proliferation of precedents, each
seemingly offering its own nuance of interpretation, would inevitably present
problems. But this is increased by the natural tendency of the technical and
limiting precedent to gain the flare of publicity which the liberal decision
does not. There is little to say when applying a discretionary rule in its
spirit; indeed, a formal opinion is likely to be eschewed. But the limiting
decision must be explained, if not apologized for, and, through the processes
of competitive publication, becomes the only known authority in the
premises.49 For this reason practically all the amendments hitherto sug-
gested by the Committee have been in the nature of "clarifying" amend-
ments stripping away the barnacles of interpretation."0 This is a slow and
46. See Warren, supra note 45.
47. Rule A, "Standing Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure," ADvIsoay CoMITTEE
ON RULEs OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF RuLEs OF CM, L PROCEDURE,
May 1936, at 170-71; see id. at xviii; Report of April 1937, at vii; 3 MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTIcE § 86.04, at 3453, 3454 (1st ed. 1938).
48. 28 A.B.A.J. 711, 67 A.B.A. REP. 131 (1942); see Report of the Standing Committee
on Jurisprudence and Law Reform, 67 A.B.A. REP. 200-02 (1942); Clark, The Proper Func-
tion of the Supreme Court's Federal Rules Committee, 28 A.B.A.J. 521 (1942); Moore, The
Supreme Court: 1940, 1941 Terms-The Supreme Court and Judicial Administration, 28
VA. L. REv. 861, 899-907 (1942).
49. For the statement of this Gresham's Law of procedural precedents, see Clark,
"Clarifying" Amendments to the Federal Rules? 14 OHIo ST. L.J. 241, 245 (1953); Clark,
Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes and Rules, 3 VAND. L. REv.
493, 507, 508 (1950); Keeffe, Federal Rules-Proposed Amendment: Two Comments, 41
A.B.A.J. 42 (1955); Wright, Rule 56(e): A Case Study on the Need for Amending the Federal
Rules, 69 HARv. L. REv. 839, 849-50 (1956).
50. Clark, "Clarifying" Amendments to the Federal Rules? 14 OHIo ST. L.J. 241 (1953);
Keeffe, Federal Rules-Proposed Amendment: Two Comments, 41 A.B.A.J. 42 (1955);
Nordbye, Comments on Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United
States District Courts, 18 F.R.D. 105; Tolman, Advisory Committee's Proposals to Amend the
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delayed process; criticism at the time of the decision would be much more
effective, as it would naturally be less extensive when made decision by
decision. And in this -area, dealing not with defining substantive rights so
much as providing their speedy vindication, supervision and suggestion
by a central body should be welcomed, as it would not be in substantive
areas.5 1
Such a system might well provide a readily perceived answer to the
most enduring, if ill conceived, criticism of the rules, namely, the number of
decisions and books that they have inspired. 52 The number of course is
undoubted, but the conclusion that all are necessary to a proper interpreta-
tion and understanding is really a superficial deduction which is a complete
non sequitur. A little examination of the character of the decisions would
disclose as much. The greater number still cite the rules as an easy and
complete answer to problems in hand, as witness the most cited rule of all,
the "clearly erroneous" requirement for upsetting findings of fact, Rule
52(a). 53 The tribute of extensive citation cannot be disparagement lest
Wigmore on Evidence itself be tried and found wanting. Though the Bank-
ruptcy Act has led to many, many rulings, that does not show that it is a
poor Act or one not expressive of sound public policy. The plethora of
cases telling us that a court will not reverse fact findings unless clearly
erroneous does not demonstrate that the rules are either unwise or un-
intelligible. As I have indicated earlier, those rulings (after all, compara-
tively few against the total) which limit the rules should be soon pruned
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 40 A.B.A.J. 843 (1954); Wright, Amendments to the Federal
Rules: The Function of a Continuing Committee, 7 VAND. L. REV. 521 (1954); Wright,
Rule 56(e): A Case Study on the Need for Amendilug the Federal R4des, 69 HARv. L. REV. 839
(1956).
51. The concept of annual reports by an advisory committee, so strongly supported
in the authorities cited notes 47, 48 supra, is thus coming back into favor, cf. Addresses
before the ABA Section of Judicial Administration, supra note 43, in the wake of some
publicized objections to alleged overamendment of the rules, attacking the Committee's
proposed amendments of 1955 which have not been acted upon by the Court. Thus the
amount of amendment was stated as affecting one-fourth of the rules when a closer analysis
would show-if the point is important-that less than one-tenth of the separate provisions
were involved. Moore, Separate Statement, in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, Oct. 1955, at 6-8. Reliance was also placed upon
an unauthenticated statement against "tinkering" attributed to Chief Justice Stone
whose favorable views are cited in note I supra. The Advisory Committee's reasoned
conclusions in support of its proposals are found in its Foreword and separate Notes, in
the REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra. See also the articles cited note 50 supra.
The Idaho, North Dakota, and Wyoming Rules (1957) adopt most or all of the proposed
amendments, as does the draft of the Alabama Rules. See note 2 supra.
52. Greenberg, Myth and Reality about Courts, Judges and Justice, 12 THE RECORD
246, 250, 251 (1957); Report of Committee to Cooperate with the Judicial Council, 69
N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N REP. 342, 351-67 (1946); Rothschild, Rformulating the Jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals, 13 BROOKLYN L. REV. 14, 16, 17 (1947).
53. Elimination in 1948 of the "bill of particulars" as an unnecessary weight toward
detailed pleadings quite completely removed the most prolific source of rulings in the first
decade of the rules. See, e.g., Clark, Experience under the Amendments to the Federal A1ules of
Civil Procedure, 8 F.R.D. 497.
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off by action of the rule-making authorities.14 The others, being harmless,
should be tolerated-perhaps encouraged because of the interest they
stimulate in the writers. On the whole the divisions in view would appear
to be declining, so that the advent of continuous supervision under the new
plan could easily soon make them of negligible effect."
III. SOME CURRENT OPPOSITION AND LocAL VARIATIONS:
THE NEW YORK PROPOSAL
Despite its demonstrated inadequacy, constant reiteration of this
superficial charge has had some apparent effect in fanning opposition
in some states, an opposition sure to arise in our profession, as experience
shows, whenever new ways of court action are proposed. Some of this
may well be jealousy of federal success, but more probably it is but the
usual fear of the older and settled members of the legal profession who
see their skills being challenged and found even detrimental to progress.
Happily reform is not now so long delayed as in the famous 100-year
struggle, largely lay-led and sparked, in England." The younger members
of the bar, and the junior bar associations in particular, are showing an
interest in the federal system which is aiding in its rapid spread. 7 For
proof of the correctness of their course they can point not only to the success
of the federal system, but to the problems raised by the confusing half-
measures of reform and the general discontent they engender. While every
reform movement must take note of the federal movement, even if to
try to evade it, there is now no one settled system in opposition, but only
confusing intermixtures of the federal practice denatured by local rules.
No one of these systems seems satisfactory; Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Missouri,
Pennsylvania, Texas-all suggest the need of more thorough reform."8
54. See Clark, "Clarifying" Amendments to the Federal Rules? 14 OHIO ST. L.J. 241
(1953).
55. Perhaps the most serious schism remaining concerns the scope of summary judg-
ment. See Wright, Rule 56(e): A Case Study on the Need for Amending the Federal Rules,
69 HARv. L. REv. 839 (1956). The rule on Substitution of Parties-Rule 25(a)(d)-has
become inadequate because of later legislative changes out of the Committee's control.
See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED AMEND-
MENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS,
Oct. 1955, at 29-33; Perry v. Allen, 239 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1956).
56. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 17-21 (2d ed. 1947); Sunderland, The English Struggle for
Procedural Reform, 39 HARV. L. REV. 725 (1926).
57. Thus in Connecticut, federal discovery, long supported by the junior bar, has now
been accepted and is urged by the State Bar Association itself. See 31 CONN. B.J. 410-15
(1957).
58. Extensive criticisms with respect to these states were cited in CLARK, CODE
PLEADING 24, 50-54 (and nn.59, 145-50), 82-83 nn.24 , 25 (2d ed. 1947); see Amram,
A Reply to Professor Wright, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 948 (1953); Clark, The Texas and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 20 TEXAS L. REV. 4 (1941); Graubart, Rejoinder from Pennsylvania,
101 U. PA. L. REV. 959 (1953); Wright, Modern Pleading and the Pennsylvania Rules,
101 U. PA. L. REv. 909 (1953). The report in Vestal, New Iowa Discovery Rules, 43 IOWA
L. REV. 8 (1957), is most interesting, as is Ten Years of Missouri Civil Procedure---a Sym-
posium, 3 ST. Louis U.L.J. 323 (1955).
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Some of these illustrate particularly the evils of attempted reform by
statute, rather than by rules of court; all show a resistance (in varying
degrees) to wholehearted action.19 No more convincing argument for the
federal rules can be found than these local variations.
Against this background it is indeed a matter of keen regret that the
steps so far taken for reform in New York seem to follow this outmoded
pattern. It is true that reform in New York has always faced unusual
obstacles." The sheer bulk of cases and of courts tends toward paralysis
and inertia. The lack of clearly developed procedural objectives promotes
such a diversity of ruling that support for practically any position, sound or
unsound, can be found somewhere in the precedents. The historic and
continuing rivalry between upstate New York and metropolitan New York
City makes any c6-operative advance seem but a dream; and now sharp
discord between state and federal authorities has presented an added source
of discord. But even so, reformers must follow their dream and leave
compromise to others; else they will soon find that they have nothing to
compromise.8 1
The new system for New York, so far as it has been disclosed by the
procedural Advisory Committee for the Temporary Commission on the
New York Courts, seems a curious thing. Its underlying purpose or objective
is rather difficult to fathom. One senses a conceived necessity to use much
of the federal system while disguising this use so far as may be. Since the
New York system already followed practically all the federal joinder rules
(for both parties and causes) and since some at least of the discovery rules
were being applied, it was necessary to make use of the federal system in
large part in any event.6 2 So far as actual discovery had gone, and arguments
for further advance pointed, there seemed but one direction for the reformers
and that into the area occupied by the federal rules. That is probably the
actual direction of these new provisions. But the increased bulk of rules,
one-third to one-half over the corresponding provisions, raises questions
59. Thus the Alabama attempt and the Missouri partial revision took the form of
statutes, rather than rules, while the New York draft, discussed below, apparently contem-
plates an intermixture of statutes and rules. See OumiNE OF WORKING DRAFT, 1957
REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY Com iSSION ON THE CouRTs, N.Y. LEGIS. Doc. No. 6(b),
at 11-14 (hereinafter cited as TEMPORARY COMMISSION). A promising venture in Nebraska,
see Simmons, Why New Rules of Civil Procedure Now? 26 J. Ai. JuD. Soc'y 170 (1943);
Clark, The Nebraska Rules of Civil Procedure, 21 NEB. L. REv. 307 (1942), was "rejected"
by the legislature. Neb. Sess. Laws 1943, c. 63; 27 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 19 (1943).
60. Clark, A Modern Procedure for New York, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1194 (1955); Clark
& Wright, supra note 13; Mitchell, supra note 19.
61. Clark, Dissatisfaction with Piecemeal Reform, 24 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 121 (1940);
see authorities. cited note 58 supra.
62. TmpORARY COMMISSION 114-60; Supporting Studies, id. at 429-94, 553-624; see
Weinstein & Bergman, New York Procedures to Obtain Information in Civil Litigation, 32
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1066 (1957); Weinstein, Gleit & Kay, Procedures for Obtaining Information
before Trial, 35 TEXAS L. REV. 481 (1957).
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that remain unanswered. There are such abstractions as a provision for
complete "disclosure" of all evidence, which, being only a pious hope and
not an actual mandate, has no place in the code, since its promise cannot be
matched by fulfillment. It was even thought necessary to discard the well-
known and apt title "Discovery" for the inadequate term "Disclosure"
taken from the hopelessly restricted practice in Connecticut, for which the
State Bar Association of Connecticut, ironically enough, is now hoping to
substitute the federal rules.6 3
The contrast between the New York and federal systems is clearly
illustrated by the divergent approaches to the basic question of the manner
of stating the case in the complaint. The old code requirement of "stating
the facts constituting the cause of action" did perhaps its greatest damage
in promoting uncertainty, confusion, and wasted effort in the courts of
New York;"4 and a part of the original opposition to federal uniform proce-
dure was the fear lest New York practice be forced upon the rest of the
country.6 5 With the need for clarity without technicality in mind, the
Advisory Committee by precept and illustration established a system of
general pleading not at all a departure from the best common-law precedents,
and not the "notice" pleading often advocated by many whose aims are
high, but whose ideas are unclear." In view of its importance, it is not un-
natural that the plan as adopted by the Supreme Court was at first mis-
understood in some quarters and opposed in others. Perhaps the wonder
is that this assault on a sacred icon of past law was so generally accepted.
At any rate one of the most concrete attacks for restoration of the old
mystical formula centered in the Ninth Circuit 67 and led to proposals which
63. TEmPoRARY ComunssioN 114.
64. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 225-38, 262, 263 (2d ed. 1947); articles cited note 60
supra; Recent New York Pleading Cases, Supporting Studies, TEMpoRARY CoMssIoN
403-28; Weinstein & Distler, Comments on Procedural Reform: Drafting Pleading Rules,
57 COLum. L. REv. 518 (1957).
65. This was stressed by Senator Walsh of Montana, leader of the opposition for many
years. Walsh, Rule-Making Power on the Law Side of Federal Practice, 6 ORE. L. REv.
1 (1926), reprinted in 13 A.B.A.J. 87 (1927) [answered by Pound, 13 A.B.A.J. 84 (1927),
and Hale & Sunderland, 6 ORE. L. REv. 73-81 (1926) ]; Morton, 49 A.B.A. REP. 595 (1924).
See committee reports by Senator Walsh, e.g., S. Doc. No. 105, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1927); S. REP. No. 440, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928) (to accompany S. 759); 55 A.B.A.
REP. 527 (1930); Clark, Procedural Reform and the Supreme Court, 8 THE AtkmacAN MER-
cuRY 445 (1926); Mitchell, supra note 19.
66. See CLARK, CODE PLEADING 56, 57, 68, 69, 240, 241 (2d ed. 1947), following pages
29, 30, 36, 37, 163 of the first edition (1928); Clark, Alabama's Procedural Reform and the
National Movement, 9 ALA. L. REv. 167, 172-74 (1957). See also Reports of the Advisory
Committee cited note 68 infra. I do not object to the statement of aim, rather than defini-
tion, of a rule in such good cases as Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1945), and Conley
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
67. Claim or Cause of Action, 13 F.R.D. 253-79; McCaskill, The Modern Philosophy
of Pleading: A Dialogue Outside the Shades, 38 A.B.A.J. 123 (1952); cf. MooRE, FEDERAL
RULES AND OFFICIAL FOR.s 88 (1956); Tucker, Proposal for Retention of the Louisiana
System of Fact Pleading, 13 LA. L. REv. 395 (1953). But see McMahon, The Case Against
Fact Pleading in Louisiana, 13 LA. L. REv. 369 (1953).
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the Advisory Committee considered on reference by the Court. So the
Committee in its latest Reports in 1954 and 1955 made a restatement of
principles and objectives which I think can be taken as a definitive expression
of modern procedural objectives. As it says: "The intent and effect of the
rules is to permit the claim to be stated in general terms; the rules are
designed to discourage battles over mere form of statement and to sweep
away the needless controversies which the codes permitted that served
either to delay trial on the merits or to prevent a party from having a trial
because of mistakes in statement." Its conclusion was that Rule 8(a)(2)
should not be changed, since it "adequately sets forth the characteristics
of good pleading" and, while doing away "with the confusion resulting from
the use of 'facts' and 'cause of action,' "yet requires a disclosure of adequate
information by a pleader "as the basis of his claim for relief as distinguished
from a bare averment that he wants relief and is entitled to it." 68 And this
explanation appears to have given general satisfaction, so that the agitation
for change or clarification has entirely subsided."
In the light of this experience and against the New York background
of hopeless confusion in "stating the facts," it is particularly discouraging
to note the lack of firm approach to this basic issue shown by the New
York reformers. In fact their suggestions seem so hesitant or blind that
it is not possible to deduce just what is intended. Thus proposed Rule 26.5
makes the basic requirement that of "fair notice," that delusive term so
attractive to text writers (perhaps since it can be made to mean all things
to all men) but never yet a general rule of pleading for major courts.70
It is of course a pure abstraction, without content except as injected by the
immediate user, worthy to stand with the abstractions which were so un-
68. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURTS, Oct. 1955, at 18, 19, following ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCE-
DURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, May 1954, at 8, 9, accepted as
definitive in Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1957). In the light of this result
and the background cited in note 66 supra, the analysis of the Nagler case presented in
58 CoLUM. L. REv. 408 (1958) must be considered misconceived, and its title "Adequacy
of Notice Pleading Reasserted in Second Circuit Private Antitrust Suits" quite misleading.
69. More recently there has been some movement for a redefinition of Rule 8(a) to
require detailed specifications in the so-called "Big Case" or protracted case. But there is
no authority for such differentiation, and experience suggests the inutility of the course
which has been rejected by the official authorities and precedents. See authorities cited in
Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1957); Clark, Special Pleading in the "Big
Case"'? 21 F.R.D. 45. See also New Home Appliance Center, Inc. v. Thompson, 250 F.2d
881 (10th Cir. 1957).
70. See note 66 supra. Proposed Rule 26.5 reads as follows: "Particularity of state-
ments generally. Statements shall be sufficiently particular to give the court and parties
fair notice of the transactions or occurrences intended to be proved and the nature of each
cause of action or defense. Pleading forms contained in the appendix of forms are sufficient
under these rules and are illustrative of the degree of particularity required." TEmPORARY
ComiissioN 62-63.
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fortunate a feature of the original Field Code.7' But at once we perceive
an anomaly. The "notice" concept is normally employed to signify a
rejection of both fact and issue pleading in favor of a system of unusual
generality of expression. 2 Yet apparently the intent here is just the opposite,
for statements shall be "sufficiently particular" to give the court and parties
"fair notice of the transactions or occurrences intended to be proved and
the nature of each cause of action or defense."73 In terms this goes beyond
even the old fact pleading in New York. This idea of greater particularity
seems to be supported by other provisions, such as "26.6. Particularity
as to specific matters," and "26.7. Particularity in specific actions."7 4 Such
conflict or vagueness makes the proposed illustrative forms of the utmost
importance as a guide to a determination of rule intent; but as yet at least
these forms have not appeared. Perhaps the draftsmen have not yet been
able to settle upon their own meaning of these provisions.
Since it i' my firm conviction that halfhearted reform is worse than
none at all-having all the vices of novelty and none of the virtues of lasting
improvement 75-I must reluctantly conclude that New York is not yet
ready for the substantial lift, as well as the good hard work, which the situa-
tion both demands and promises. Perhaps some delay in accomplishment
may here pay returns, as it has in other instances, such as New Jersey,
when delayed reform has been complete. Here is the kind of situation where
revivification of federal rule-making should be vitally important. Indeed,
an active and functioning department of the federal courts, again con-
stantly at work in the field, may well provide opportunity for the kind of
collaboration among rule-making authorities so pertinently suggested by
Dean Maynard Pirsig a few years ago.76 Thus, for possible halting and
reluctant movements on ill-assorted fronts, there may be substituted once
more a united approach to the real ideal of a uniform and natural procedure
for courts, both federal and state.
71. For various examples of these abstractions-in addition to the classic "facts
constituting the cause of action"-involving joinder of causes or of parties, see CLARx,
CODE PLEADING 22, 23, 64, 358, 365 (2d ed. 1947); Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and
'Interpreting Procedural Codes and Rules, 3 VAND. L. REv. 493 (1950).
72. See note 66 supra.
73. See note 70 supra.
74. TE poRARY ComixssioN 64-68.
75. 1 have often pointed this out; see notes 60, 61 supra.
76. This suggestion was made in an address before the Section of Judicial Administra-
tion of the ABA at Boston in August 1953. See Clark, The Evershed Report and English
Procedural Reform, 29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1046, 1060 (1954).
